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Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings
often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete
transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on differ-
ent models of preferences. We review some of the reasons that have
been put forward to justify more complex modeling, and review some
of the techniques that have been proposed to obtain models of such
preferences.
∗This work has received support under the program “LABEX MS2T” launched by the French Government
and implemented by ANR with the references ANR-11-IDEX-0004-02. This is an author version. The final
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version is identical to the final publication, except for this footnote, a few corrected typos, and a rephrasing of
the very last paragraph (page 14). Erratum: in the first paragraph of Section 4.1, contrary to what has been
written, the points of view are not necessarily represented by weak-orders. This is illustrated in Example 3
where the relation C may violate transitivity (consider x1 = (2, 0, 1), x2 = (1, 2, 0) and x3 = (0, 1, 2)).
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1 Introduction
Preferences of agents are usually assumed to be representable with
a weak order (a complete and transitive binary relation). We are
interested in discussing the completeness assumption.
Preference models are especially important in two fields: choos-
ing an alternative when it is evaluated according to different aspects
(multi-criteria decision making, or MCDM), and picking an alterna-
tive whose quality depends on states of the world that are uncertainly
known (decision making under uncertainty, or DMU). In MCDM, the
common assumption is that the alternatives, i.e., the state of the
world, is known without ambiguity, and the difficulty is to determine
the structure of the user’s preferences over these well-defined alterna-
tives. In DMU, the alternatives are usually not described over several
criteria, but the problem is to recommend an alternative given our
uncertainty about the world.
In this paper, we review some reasons to relax preference com-
pleteness and modeling approaches (either in MCDM or DMU) that
support this relaxation. We discuss in particular reasons to consider
that the assumption of completeness is empirically falsified. Although
these reasons are not new, we think it is interesting to discuss this
question here and now because of (as we perceive it) a relative igno-
rance of these discussions in research fields that use preference models
but are not specialized in preference modeling per se, and because of
recent and ongoing advances in analysis of incomplete preferences.
We try to cover a wide scope by discussing some of the goals, as-
sumptions and basic definitions related to preference modeling and
reviewing a wide range of techniques for obtaining such models. In
counterpart, this review does not claim to be comprehensive and does
not provide technical details. To further simplify the discussion, we
pretend that the MCDM and DMU contexts are sharply separated.
(In reality, it is often possible to cover MCDM contexts while taking
uncertainty into account [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993].) We also do not
discuss transitivity.
We briefly present the MCDM and DMU settings considering com-
pleteness in Section 2. Section 3 discusses completeness in descrip-
tive and normative approaches (recalling their difference at the same
time). Finally, we review models that departs from completeness in
Section 4.
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2 Assuming completeness
In this section, we are going to recall the main models that consider
completeness and transitivity of preferences as a consequence of nat-
ural requirements, if not as pre-requisite of any preference modeling.
We will also recall normative views and descriptive views of these
concepts.
2.1 MCDM
We consider a simple and classical setting in MCDM. We assume that
the alternatives are evaluated using a set of criteria G, each having
an evaluation scale Xg. The set of all possible alternatives is X =∏
g∈G Xg, that is, every combination of evaluations are considered
possible. We are interested in a preference relation  defined as a
binary relation over X .
Example 1. Say the Decision Maker (DM) must choose what to plant
in her garden. The set of alternatives X are all possible vegetables,
the criteria G = {g1, g2, g3} measure the taste, quantity, and price of
each vegetable. The scales are Xg1 = {A, B, C, D}, a set of labels,
with x1 representing the taste of the vegetable x ∈ X as considered
by the DM (A is the worst taste, D the best), Xg2 = [0, 100], with x2
representing the number of meals that the DM would enjoy if deciding
to plant x, and Xg3 = R, thus x3 indicates the price to pay for planting
x. △
Typical approaches in MCDM assume that there is some real-
valued function v : X → R mapping alternatives to their values,
and that x  y iff v(x) ≥ v(y).
2.2 DMU
In the simplest form of DMU considered here (SDMR, for Simple
Decision Making under Risk), we consider a set S of possible states
of the world, a finite set of consequences C, and each act x : S → C
is modeled as a function where x(s) is the consequence of performing
x when s is the actual state of the world. Define X , for simplic-
ity, as all possible or imaginary acts (thus X = CS). In SDMR,
uncertainty is modeled by a probability measure p over the power
set of S, P(S), thus with p(s) ∈ [0, 1] indicating the probability of
occurence of s (with s ⊆ S), and p(S) = 1. We consider a preference
relation  defined as a binary relation over X . Given an act x and
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a probability measure p, it is usually convenient to view x as px, a
probability mass over the consequences: define px : C → [0, 1] as
px(c) = p(x−1(c)), where x−1(c) designate the set of states in which
x leads to the consequence c. Such a px is usually called a lottery.
Example 2. Assume you want to go out and wonder about taking
or leaving your umbrella. You consider relevant weather state to be
A =“shiny” and B =“raining”, with A, B ⊆ S. We assume A ∪ B =
S for simplicity. Two simple actions are x1: “take the umbrella”
and x2: “leave the umbrella home”, and the consequences are c1:
“encumbered” (when taking your umbrella, irrelevant of the weather),
c2: “free” (when leaving your umbrella and weather is A), and c3:
“wet” (when leaving your umbrella and weather is B). Assume the
probabilities of the states A and B are 0.2 and 0.8. Then the constant
act x1 can also be described as px1 with px1(c1) = 1 and px1 being
zero everywhere else, and similarly the act x2 can be associated to
px2 where px2(c1) = 0, px2(c2) = 0.2, px2(c3) = 0.8. △
In most DMU frameworks, consequences can be mapped to a real-
valued reward or utility through a function u1 : C → R, in which
case u1(x(s)) denotes the utility of performing x in state s, and acts
can be evaluated using a utility function u : X → R defined as
u(x) =
∑
s∈S p(s)u1(x(s)), such that u(x) ≥ u(y) iff x  y. It follows
from this definition that u and u1 are coherent, in the following sense:
given an act x that brings a consequence c with probability one,
u(x) = u1(c).
Expected utility has been justified axiomatically by different au-
thors, the main ones being Savage [1972], de Finetti [2017] and von
Neumann and Morgenstern [2004] (hereafter, vNM). In the de Finetti
setting, utilities are given as random variables, and a precise price
can be associated to each random variable. That reasoning should be
probabilistic and choices made according to expected utility follow
from two axioms: linearity and boundedness of those prices. vNM
postulate conditions on  ensuring that utility functions u and u1
satisfying the above conditions exist. The axioms assume complete-
ness of the preferences, and the probabilities are assumed to be given.
In the Savage setting, both probabilities and expected utility follow
from axioms about preferences between acts. In particular, his first
axiom (P1) is that any pair of act should be comparable. Complete-
ness is therefore postulated in the axioms, and expected utility and
probabilistic reasoning follow from the axioms.
While these theoretical constructs have set very strong foundations
for the use of probabilities, in practice experiments such as the Ells-
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berg [1961] urn (contradicting Savage sure-thing principle) suggest
that people do not always act according to expected utility [Mac-
Crimmon and Larsson, 1979].
Since then, many different extensions have been proposed [Wakker,
2010, Quiggin, 2012]. Others propose to relax the probabilistic as-
sumption, for instance by considering a possibilistic setting (e.g.,
Dubois et al. [2003] discuss Savage-like axioms), by considering sets
of probabilities such as in decision under ambiguity [Gajdos et al.,
2008], or by simply considering completely missing information, such
as Wald’s [1992] celebrated maximin criterion.
All models presented thus far assume that  is complete (by which
we mean that if  is incomplete, then no suitable function exists in
the class of functions admitted by models presented thus far).
3 Questioning completeness
Before discussing the reasonableness of restrictions about , we need
to say a word about what those preferences really represent and what
the goal of modeling those may be. Indeed, the meaning of complete-
ness depend on whether a descriptive or a normative approach is
adopted. In particular, we will later discuss “how much” descriptive
one must accept to be in order for the completeness hypothesis to
stand.
3.1 Descriptive and normative approaches
In the descriptive approach to preferences, the goal of the model is
to reflect the observed behavior of a DM. Typically, a set of sample
choices of the DM is first collected, say, of choices of food products
in his favorite store, and we would then try to obtain the model that
best reflects his choice attitude. Or, we would query an individual’s
preference about pairs of objects, and then try to build a predictive
model on the whole set of possible pairs of alternatives (a method
called active learning in the machine learning community). Such a
model may be used to predict his behavior, e.g. for marketing or
regulation purposes.
Under the normative approach, the goal is to model the way the DM
ought to choose rationally. Rationality may corresponds to accepted
external norms, or to rules accepted by the DM after careful thinking.
(In the second case, the term prescriptive or constructive may be used
instead of normative, but different authors use these terms differently
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[Roy, 1993, Tsoukiàs, 2007]; we will stick to the term “normative”
as an umbrella.) In both cases, the decision outcome using such
approach may differ from empirically observed decisions. Consider
as an example a recruiter in an enterprise who wants to model the
recruitment procedure. After having collected data, it may appear
that for some (possibly unconscious) reason, the recruitment is biased
against some particular socio-economic category. The DM may then
want to find a recruitment strategy that avoids such biases, therefore
actively trying to build a model contradicting empirical observations.
McClennen [1990], Guala [2000] discuss philosophical grounds for
accepting a normative model. Anand [1987], Mandler [2001] discuss
normative grounds for usual axioms about preferences, including com-
pleteness.
Choosing between normative or descriptive approaches is not al-
ways easy. For instance recommender systems often adopt a descrip-
tive approach. But descriptive approaches will, by design, reflect our
cognitive limitations. Those limitations are numerous and sometimes
obviously not in agreement with what the DM himself would do when
thinking more carefully, as will be illustrated in Section 3.3. Providing
(more) normative-based automatic recommendations might help pro-
vide sound advices, help increase serendipity, and possibly build trust
(or avoid mistrust) in the recommender system. For example, the DM
might appreciate that the recommender system’s advices protect him
from exploitations of the DM’s cognitive limitations by merchants.
(As an old but known example, “the credit card lobby is said to in-
sist that any price difference between cash and card purchases should
be labeled a cash discount rather than a credit surcharge” [Tversky
and Kahneman, 1986].)
3.2 Defining and testing incompleteness
Defining and testing incompleteness in preferences requires to define
“preference” (and thus ), as its everyday usage can be ambiguous:
Frankfurt [1971] gives seven interpretations of “to want to”, and this
exercice transposes, mutatis mutandis, to the notion of preference.
Here is what vNM say about the preference relation (we have taken
this from the very insightful presentation of the vNM approach by
Fishburn [1989]): “It is clear that every measurement – or rather
every claim of measurability – must ultimately be based on some
immediate sensation, which possibly cannot and certainly need not be
analyzed any futher. In the case of utility the immediate sensation of
preference – of one object or aggregate of objects as against another –
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provides this basis” (3.1.2); “Let us for the moment accept the picture
of an individual whose system of preferences is all-embracing and
complete, i.e. who, for any two objects or rather for any two imagined
events, possesses a clear intuition of preference. More precisely we
expect him, for any two alternative events which are put before him
as possibilities, to be able to tell which of the two he prefers.” (3.3.2)
(The “events” correspond to our alternatives.)
Expanding on vNM, we define that the DM prefers a to b when
expressing an intuitive attraction towards a when presented with a
and b, or an equal attraction towards a and b; and this attraction
does not change along a reasonable time span and as well as when
irrelevant changes in the context happen. Here, we assume that a, b
are alternatives in X described by their evaluations on the criteria (in
MCDM) or by the relevant probability distributions and consequences
(in SDMR), and consider as irrelevant changes anything that does not
change those descriptions.
Under this definition, postulating completeness of  amounts to
say that choices of the DM will not change along time or when irrel-
evant changes happen. While this is not the only possible definition
(others will be mentioned), it appears reasonable and sufficiently for-
mal to make the condition empirically testable.
A first, immediate argument against completeness is that prefer-
ences are not stable over even very short period of time, a well-
accepted fact in experimental psychology. Quoting Tversky [1969],
individuals “are not perfectly consistent in their choices. When faced
with repeated choices between x and y, people often choose x in some
instances and y in others. Furthermore, such inconsistencies are
observed even in the absence of systematic changes in the decision
maker’s taste which might be due to learning or sequential effects.
It seems, therefore, that the observed inconsistencies reflect inherent
variability or momentary fluctuation in the evaluative process.”
This argument may not be strong enough however. In absence of
other arguments, one might agree that preferences are in reality in-
complete but claim that they may appropriately be modeled as com-
plete: a model of complete preferences would simply deviate from
time to time from what individuals declare because of (perhaps rare)
random fluctuations in their expressions of preferences. In order to
discuss this hypothesis, we turn to the second (and much more in-
teresting) reason for failure of completeness, which is also brought
by the literature in empirical psychology. It appears that preferences
change may not be attributed solely to random fluctuations: they
change in systematic ways according to changes in the presentation
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of the alternatives or the context that should have no impact from a
normative point of view.
3.3 Empirical evidence of incompleteness
In multicriteria contexts, psychologists have shown systematic differ-
ences between the so-called choice and matching elicitation proce-
dures [Tversky et al., 1988]. Assume you want to know which of two
alternatives x, y the DM prefers, in a problem involving two criteria.
You can present both and directly ask for a choice. Alternatively,
with the matching procedure, you present x with its two evaluations
g1(x), g2(x), and y′ with only g1(y′) = g1(y), and ask the DM for which
value g2(y′) y′ would be indifferent to x. Assuming  satisfies dom-
inance and transitivity, you then know that x  y iff g2(y′) ≥ g2(y).
Although the two elicitation procedures should be equivalent, the
authors confirm the prominence hypothesis stating that the more
prominent criterion has more importance in choice than in match-
ing. One of their study confront the subject to a hypothetical choice
between two programs for control of a polluted beach. Program x
completely cleans up the beach at a yearly cost of $750 000; program
y partially cleans it up for a yearly cost of $250 000. They assume
that pollution is the more prominent criterion here, hence expect that
x will be chosen more often in choice than in matching. Indeed, 48%
out of the 104 subjects confronted with a choice procedure selected
x, whereas only 12% out of the 170 subjects selected it in a matching
procedure. Similar effects apply to lotteries in SDMR [Luce, 2000].
This phenomenon is known as preference reversal due to a breach of
procedure invariance. Another reversal is the one due to description
invariance (or framing effect), showing that preferences can change by
changing the descriptions of alternatives. In Tversky and Kahneman
[1981], two groups have to choose a program to prepare against an
epidemic outspring that would result otherwise in 600 deaths. The
two groups are presented with the same numeric alternatives x and
y, but on the first group the alternatives are presented in terms of
numbers of life saved, while in the second they are presented in terms
of death counts. The experiment shows that preferences differ pre-
dictably in the two groups. It is indeed well-known that results are
perceived differently depending on their descriptions as losses or gains
Thaler [1980].
Numerous other studies exist that show and discuss preference re-
versal effects [Deparis, 2012, Ch. 2 (from which we took the two
studies described here above), Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006a, Tver-
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sky et al., 1990, Kahneman et al., 1981, Kahneman and Tversky,
2000]. How to best account for and predict preference reversals is
still debated, but their existence is consensual [Wakker, 2010, Birn-
baum, 2017]. Some skeptics did try to show that preference reversals
could be attributed to deficiencies in the design of the studies, but
finally came around [Slovic and Lichtentstein, 1983].
This shows that the  relation cannot be expected to be complete
given our definition. For some alternatives, individuals may be led
to declare different preferences, denoting an absence of a clear, intu-
itive preference for each pairs of alternatives. When thinking more
about the comparison and presented with different views of the same
problem, individuals may in some cases change their preference. This
has been studied empirically [Slovic and Tversky, 1974, MacCrimmon
and Larsson, 1979, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006b], and Savage [1972,
pp. 101–103] famously reported that it happened to him.
One may of course want to preserve completeness of preferences,
for example to preserve mathematical and computational simplicity.
One way to do so, common in experimental psychology, is to restrict
further the frame in which preferences are considered. For instance,
Luce [2000] indicates clearly that he studies preferences in terms of
choice, not judgment; MacCrimmon et al. [1980] exclude some kind
of loteries from the scope of the model. In such cases, completeness
may well be justified. In other settings, such as normative approaches
or recommender systems, it is unclear that such reductions should
be enforced, as they may be hard to impose in practice or lead to
behavior that the user may not desire.
We also mention two related interesting articles: Deparis et al.
[2012] study the behavior of individuals when they are allowed to
make explicit statements of incomparability; Danan and Ziegelmeyer
[2006] propose to consider that an incomparability is observed when-
ever the DM is ready to pay a small price to postpone the decision.
Another, more evident, reason to be interested in models allowing
incompleteness is that it may well be that provided information is
insufficient to obtain a fully precise models.
The next section describes approaches that allow incomplete pref-
erence representations.
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4 Dropping completeness
4.1 Incompleteness in MCDM
Some approaches in MCDM in the family of outranking methods
[Roy, 1996, Greco et al., 2016, Bouyssou et al., 2000, 2006, Bouyssou
and Pirlot, 2015] can represent incomparabilities. A much used idea
is to take into account two points of view, leading to weak-orders 1
and 2, then define  = 1 ∩ 2. Thus, when the two weak-orders
strongly disagree about some pair of objects, the result can declare
them incomparable. As an example, consider (a simplification of) the
ELECTRE III method (our much simplified description only consider
the aspects sufficient to obtain incomparabilities). It builds a concor-
dance relation C that determines whether alternative x is sufficiently
better than y, by accounting only for the criteria in favor of x; and a
discordance relation D that determines whether x is so much worst
than y on some criterion that x cannot possibly be considered better
than y (thus implementing a veto effect). Precise definitions of C and
D depend on parameters to be fixed when implementing the method.
Then, the model declares that x  y iff xCy and not xDy.
Example 3. Consider X = R3, each criteria to be maximized, and a
model according to which xCy iff x is better than or equal to y for at
least two criteria, and xDy iff for some g, yg − xg ≥ 2. Such a model
would consider the two alternatives x = (0, 0, 2) and y = (1, 1, 0) as
incomparable: neither x  y nor y  x hold. △
Such approaches tend to consider incomparabilities as intrinsic to
the preferences, since even a completely specified preference could
lead to incomparabilities.
Robust methods in MCDM exist that distinguish conclusions about
preferences that hold for sure, given limited preferential information
from the DM, from conclusions that possibly hold. Such methods typ-
ically start from a class M of possible models (similar to hypothesis
space in machine learning) assumed to be candidate representative
models of the DM preferences. A robust method, given a class M and
a set of constraints C reducing the set of possibles models (typically
preference statements given by the DM), will consider that a is nec-
essarily preferred to b, a N b, whenever a  b for all relations  in
M that satisfy C [Greco et al., 2008].
Example 4. Assume that the only thing you know about the DM is
that she prefers x = (0, 0, 2) to y = (0, 4, 0), and you assume that
 satisfies preferencial independence, meaning that the way two al-
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ternatives compare does not change when changing equal values on
a given criterion. Thus, M contains all relations that satisfy prefer-
encial independence, and C is the constraint x ≻ y. You may then
conclude that a = (3, 0, 2) is preferred to b = (3, 4, 0), thus, a ≻N b,
but you ignore whether c = (1, 1, 1) is preferred to d = (0, 2, 2), thus,
¬(c N d) and ¬(d N c). △
In such approach, the relation N is able to represent incompara-
bilites. Incomparabilities stem here from a lack of knowledge, and
are not necessarily intrinsic to the modeled preference relation, as in
principle one could collect enough constraints C about M to iden-
tify a unique compatible relation ≻ on a set of alternatives. It is
of course also possible to include in M some models that allow for
incomparabilities [Greco et al., 2011].
4.2 Incompleteness in DMU
As recalled in Section 1, probability theory and expected utility are
the most widely used tools when having to decide under uncertainty,
and naturally induce completeness of preferences. It should however
be noted early scholars were critical about the fact that complete-
ness could hold in practice. von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953, p.
630] for example themselves considered completeness as a strong con-
dition: “it is very dubious, whether the idealization of reality which
treats this postulate as a valid one, is appropriate or even convenient”.
Many attempts to relax the completeness axioms does so by con-
siderings axioms leading to deal with sets of utilities and sets of prob-
abilities [Aumann, 1962], entangling together aspects about decision
and about information modeling.
4.2.1 Keeping precise probabilities but not expected utility
Even when having precise probabilities, there are alternatives to ex-
pected utility that induce incomplete preferences. One of them that
is particularly interesting is the notion of stochastic dominance [Levy,
1992]. Assuming that the set of consequences is completely ordered
by preference, which we denote by C = {c1, . . . , cn} where ci−1 is
preferred to ci, then a lottery px is said to stochastically dominate py
iff, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
px({c1, . . . , ci}) =
∑i
j=1 px(cj) ≥ py({c1, . . . , ci}) =
∑i
j=1 py(cj). (1)
Since Eq. (1) can be satisfied for some i and not for others, possible
incomparabilities immediately follow.
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Example 5. Consider the set of consequences C = {c1, c2, c3} and
the following lotteries (induced by different acts x1, x2, x3), given in
vectorial forms: p1 = (0.5, 0.3, 0.2), p2 = (0.6, 0.3, 0.1) and p3 =
(0.7, 0, 0.3). Then x2 stochastically dominates x1, while x3 is incom-
parable to both x1 and x2, according to stochastic dominance. △
The notion of stochastic dominance has some very attractive prop-
erties, as:
1. it does not necessitate to define utilities over consequences, and
merely requires them to be linearly ordered;
2. it can be be perceived as a criterion allowing for utilities to be
ill-defined, as px stochastically dominates py if and only if x has a
higher expected utility than y for any increasing utility function
u defined over C.
4.2.2 Incompleteness from non-precise probabilities
In the past few decades, different scholars have challenged the need for
precise probabilities associated to classical axiomatics, advocating the
use of imprecisely defined prices (expected values) or of imprecisely
defined probabilities. To mention but a few:
• Levi [1983] advocates the uses of sets of probabilities within a
logical interpretation of probabilities;
• Walley [1991] extends the de Finetti axioms by assuming that
an agent would give different buying and selling prices for an
act, therefore allowing indecision if the price is between these
bounds;
• Shafer and Vovk [2005] explores a probabilistic setting centered
on the notion of Martingale.
Such theories can most of the time be associated to the use of convex
sets of probabilities, and give rise to decision rules that extend ex-
pected utility but do allow incomparabilities. Once we accept that a
convex set P of probabilities (or a formally equivalent representation)
can represent our knowledge, incompleteness may ensue.
A prototypical way to induce incompleteness between acts from
incompleteness in probabilities is to adapt expected utility criterion,
and among rules doing so, maximality is a popular one (it is cham-
pioned by Walley, but is considered as early as the 60’s [Aumann,
1962]). Given acts x1, x2, maximality says that
x1  x2 iff u(x1) ≥ u(x2) for all p ∈ P.
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Maximality reduces to expected utility when P is a singleton.
Example 6. Going back to Example 2, imagine that x1 is indifferent to
x2 exactly when p(A) = p(“shiny”) = 1/3. Thus, u1(“encumbered”) =
1/3u1(“free”) + 2/3u1(“wet”). Then, x1 and x2 will be incomparable
according to maximality as soon as P contains at least one mass
where p(A) < 1/3, and another where p(A) > 1/3. △
It should be noted that other authors have proposed different rules:
for instance Levi [1983] recommends to use a decision rule, often
called E-admissibility, that does not give rise to an incomplete order
between acts, but rather selects all the acts that are Bayes optimal
according to at least one probability p ∈ P. In terms of order, this
comes down to consider a set of possible linear ordering, and to retain
only those elements that are maximal for at least one of them.
4.2.3 Working with sets of probabilities and utilities
Sets of probabilities are helpful to represent incomplete beliefs or
lack of information, yet it is natural to also consider cases where the
DM cannot provide a fully accurate estimation of utilities associated
to consequences, or even to completely order them. In some sense,
stochastic dominance is an extreme view of such a case, where conse-
quences are ordered but the utility function is left totally unspecified.
Other works have dealt with partially specified utilities.
• Dubra et al. [2004] represents preferences over lotteries by a set
of utility functions. Preference holds whenever the expected util-
ity for the preferred alternative is higher for all utility functions.
This idea has been applied in other contexts [Ok, 2002].
• Dubra and Ok [2002] propose to view the preference relation as
a completion of an intuitive partial preference relation: the DM
knows intuitively the result of some comparisons, and compute
the other ones by applying some reasoning process. They also
obtain a preference relation that is representable using a set of
utility functions. This approach directly tackles some of the
shortcomings described in Section 3.2.
• Manzini and Mariotti [2008] use a utility function and a vague-
ness function, representing the preference using intervals of util-
ities rather than real valued utilities. (Beyond DMU, also using
this representation, Masatlioglu and Ok [2005] assume that a
specific alternative called the status quo alternative is promi-
nently chosen whenever the DM faces a choice about which in-
comparability occur.)
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There exist a few works where both requirements of precise prob-
abilities and utilities are relaxed. This can be traced back at least to
Aumann [1962] whose axioms do not require uniqueness of utilities:
x ≻ y ⇒ u(x) > u(y), without requiring the reverse. More recently,
Galaabaatar and Karni [2013] are interested in the Savage-like con-
text where probabilities are unknown and represent an incomplete
preference relation in uncertaintly using a set of pairs of probabilities
and utilities.
5 Incompleteness: absence of knowledge or
knowledge of absence?
We have tried to browse a general picture of reasons why preference
modeling should accommodate for incompleteness, and how it can do
so in multi-criteria problems and uncertainty modeling.
One issue that transpired in most of the paper is whether incom-
pleteness should be considered as an intrinsic, or ontic property of
the preferences, in which case incomparability expresses a knowledge
of absence of relation, or if incompleteness should be considered as
an incomplete, epistemic description of a complete order, in which
case it expresses an absence of knowledge. This mirrors different
views about probability sets (Walley’s consider that they model be-
lief, without assuming an existing precise unknown distribution, while
robust Bayesians consider the opposite).
Our opinion is that both views can be legitimate in different set-
tings, and also that beyond the philosophical interest of distinguishing
the two, this can have an important practical impact: knowing that
incomparabilities are observable facts may influence strongly our in-
formation collection protocol; also, a same piece of information will
be interpreted differently. Starting, for simplicity, from an irreflexive
and transitive relation ≻, and assuming we know somehow that a is
a maximal element among three acts {a, b, c}, in the epistemic inter-
pretation, we would deduce that a is preferred to the other two acts
(a ≻ {b, c}), but in the ontic one we could only deduce that a has no
element preferred to it (¬(b ≻ a) and ¬(c ≻ a)).
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